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EXILE AND THE KINGDOM: INTEGRATION, HARASSMENT,
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
MAR C. WEBER*
Disability discrimination is more than thoughtlessness or failure
to modify standing operating procedures to accommodate people
with disabilities. Frequently, it takes the form of verbal or physical
abuse that keeps people with disabilities from exercising employment
and educational rights that the Americans with Disabilities Act' and
other laws2 have established to achieve the integration of individuals
with disabilities into mainstream society on terms of equality with
other citizens.
This Article is part of a multi-part study of harassment on the
basis of disability. In two recent articles,3 I have described the nature
of disability harassment and the existing legal remedies for it, and
then tried to advance suggestions for reform of the current law. In
the employment area, I advocate the use of the specific ADA provision
that bars all interference, coercion, threats, and intimidation4 to sup-
plement the current judicial approach, which draws an analogy to Ti-
dle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and provides relief only when
there is severe or pervasive mistreatment constituting a hostile envi-
ronment.' In the educational field, I advocate the recognition of a
damages remedy,6 which would not have to be exhausted through ad-
ministrative procedures.7
© 2003 Mark C. Weber
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organized and participated in the Stanley S. Herr Memorial Conference on Disability
Rights and Social Justice. Special thanks to my research assistants, Sara Mauk and Mary
Fette. This Article is dedicated to Stan Herr.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Other statutes of particular relevance include section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
3. Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1079 (2002) [hereinafter School Harassment]; Mark C. Weber, Workplace Harassment Claims
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A New Interpretation, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 241
(2003) [hereinafter Workplace Harassment Claims].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000).
5. Weber, Workplace Harassment Claims, supra note 3, at 253-64 (distinguishing cases in
which the "severe and pervasive" standard-applied in instances of sex and race discrimi-
nation-was used to determine the validity of disability harassment claims).
6. See Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1085-90.
7. id.
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My goal in this Article is to connect the threads of workplace and
educational disability harassment to the historical exclusion of people
with disabilities from mainstream life,' then survey the existing legal
means to remedy both harassment and the segregation on account of
disability that it creates.9 My conclusion is that much more remains to
be done to protect people with disabilities from the pervasive verbal
and physical abuse that continues to keep them from taking advan-
tage of employment and educational opportunities.1 0 The steps I ad-
vocate embrace the use of the legal remedies I have described in the
other articles, but they also include changes in vocational and welfare
programs;"1 voluntary actions by educators, 12 employers, and others; 3
and efforts to recast the social perception of disability to make up for
the decades of legally enforced exclusion and the harassment that ex-
clusion engenders. 4
Other scholars have addressed disability harassment, primarily ex-
ploring the analogy between hostile environment cases under Tide
VII and under the ADA. 5 The contribution to the literature that my
8. See infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of segregation
and harassment in employment and educational settings).
9. See infra notes 153-198 and accompanying text (reviewing causes of action for disa-
bility discrimination and harassment).
10. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text (suggesting multiple legal and socie-
tal reforms that would facilitate the integration of people with disabilities into mainstream
society).
11. See infra notes 260-270 and accompanying text (proposing a system of partial disa-
bility benefits for individuals with disabilities).
12. See infra notes 257-259 and accompanying text (encouraging schools to adopt poli-
cies against harassment).
13. See infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text (stating that employers can deter
harassment through training of employees, encouraging employees to file complaints, and
by imposing sanctions when harassment occurs).
14. See infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of focus-
ing on social relationships rather than social categories).
15. See Eric Matusewitch, Courts Are Recognizing Claims for Hostile Work Environment Under
ADA, ANDREWS EMP. LrrIG. REP., Mar. 24, 1998, at 3 (discussing disability harassment claims
based on hostile environment); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The
Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 15 CARtozo L. REv. 1475, 1476 (1994) (suggesting adaptations of Title VII
hostile environment standards for disability harassment cases); Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to
Be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 Lov. L.A.
L. REv. 795, 896-99 (1998) (collecting cases involving abusive workplaces); Christine Nea-
gle, Comment, An Analysis of the Applicability of Hostile Work Environment Liability to the ADA, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 715, 717-25, 737 (2001) (discussing case law and evaluating Ra-
vitch's approach); see also Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Employment:
A Non-Retrospective, 52 ALA. L. REv. 375, 398-406 (2000) (discussing disability harassment
claims). Other works, including some of mine, discuss disability harassment in elementary
and secondary education. See Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3; see also Adam A. Mi-
lani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools: The Validity Of Schools' Regulation of Fighting Words
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project tries to make is to take the study of harassment past the com-
parison to Title VII, and to tie it more closely to the growing scholarly
movement that applies a minority group model to discrimination
against people with disabilities. 6 My project attempts to develop the
law reform implications of using the minority group approach.
The minority group model stresses the fact that disabling condi-
tions do not necessarily disable, were it not for the human-created
environment in which persons with disabilities find themselves: one in
which physical, legal, and attitudinal barriers keep them from mobil-
ity, from employment opportunities, and from social interaction.' 7
Some writing, including some of my own, has challenged various as-
pects of this minority group or civil rights-integrationist model,18 but
this Article operates within the model's framework.
and the Consequences If They Do Not, 28 AKRON L. REv. 187, 232-35 (1995) (discussing claims
for hostile environment under 29 U.S.C. § 794). For a valuable discussion of common law
and other state law remedies for disability harassment, see Ravitch, supra, at 1496-98. For a
discussion of common law remedies for disability harassment of public school students, see
Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1119-23.
16. See Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, Dis-
crimination, and Activism, 44J. Soc. IssuEs 3, 6-14 (1988) (developing minority group model
of people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disabil-
ity and Capitalism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 172, 174 (LennardJ. Davis ed., 1997)
(describing "the minority-group model of disability"); see alsoJAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING
ABOUT US WITHOUT Us: DISASILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 127 (1998) (defending
the continued importance of the minority group-civil rights model of disability); SiMI LIN-
TON, CLAIMING DISABILITY 9-17 (1998) (describing oppression against people with disabili-
ties); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 809, 814-15 (1966) (applying a civil rights approach to disability); Jonathan C. Drim-
mer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legisla-
tion and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1355-59 (1993)
(describing the civil rights model of disability). See generally Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal: Interro-
gating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE
L. & POL'V REv. 1, 9 (1999). Berg explains that:
This social-poliical model rejects the premise of the moral and biomedical per-
spectives that disability is inherent within the individual. . . . [I]t understands
disability as contextual and relational ... as a broader social construct reflecting
society's dominant ideology and cultural assumptions. While it acknowledges the
existence of biologically based differences, the social-political model locates the
meaning of those differences-and the individual's experience of them as bur-
densome-in society's stigmatizing attitudes and biased structures rather than in
the individual.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. See, e.g., Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1355 (describing the civil rights model as based
on the idea that "the barriers facing the disabled community do not result solely from
physical limitations, but from social standards created by an ablist society, from historic
oversight of the disabled population, and from the fears and prejudice from centuries of
discrimination") (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 335, 336 (2000) (criticizing liberal policy assumptions behind
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Part I of this Article describes the segregation of people with disa-
bilities, its roots in eugenicist thinking, and the legal response that the
ADA makes to it.19 Part II details the role that harassment plays in
furthering segregation despite the presence of the ADA.20 Part III
looks at the ADA and other legal remedies for harassment, consider-
ing their uses and limits.2 1 Part IV explores potential legal remedies,
notably 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) for workplace cases and the reform of
the exhaustion doctrine in educational cases.22 Part V suggests several
measures apart from anti-harassment law that would promote integra-
tion of people with disabilities into mainstream society.23 Finally, Part
VI raises the idea of trying to reform society at large to make full inte-
gration a reality.
24
I. SEGREGATION, ITS HISTORY, AND THE ADA's RESPONSE
The recent history of society's treatment of people with disabili-
ties is a progression from forced separation toward integration into
the population as a whole.25 People with disabilities have moved from
isolation to admixture, while remaining members of a large26 and di-
verse 27 minority group. 28  The bad old days of segregation were in-
the ADA); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 335, 341 (2001) (noting limits on the civil rights approach as
embodied in the ADA); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist
Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 912-19 (suggesting the need for post-integrationist
approach to disability theory).
19. See infra notes 25-108 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 109-152 and accompanying text.
21. See infta notes 153-198 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 199-235 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 236-269 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
25. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 16, at 814-16 (noting the gradual movement
away from custodial attitudes toward an integrative approach).
26. How large is a matter of both definition and debate. The Supreme Court used the
congressional estimate of 43 million disabled Americans found in the ADA to justify a
narrow reading of the statutory definition for persons protected by the statute. Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (ruling that "protected group" excludes
persons for whom measures such as appliances and medication mitigate substantial limits
on major life activities); see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521
(1999) (citing Sutton, supra).
27. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv. 397,
466-84 (2000) (discussing socio-economic, educational, and physical differences in the
larger group of disabled persons); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(noting diversity of people with disabilities); H. Stephen Kaye, Disability Watch: The Status of
People with Disabilities in the United States, Disability Rights Advocates, at http://www.dralegal.
org/publications/dw (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
28. See Bagenstos, supra note 27, at 418 (describing disability as a "subordinated group
status"); Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1355-56 (describing the civil rights model).
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deed bad. Individuals with disabilities were locked away in institutions
because they were seen as threats to the well-being of the population
as a whole.29 The ideology of eugenics called for their exclusion from
"normal" society, and sometimes for their elimination altogether.3 0
The brave new days of legally protected integration are better, but still
not fully satisfactory. Much forced separation remains, and people
with disabilities feel the ill effects. 3'
A. Then
Society first confined people with disabilities in almshouses, and
then in institutions.3 2 Alone and ignored, people with disabling con-
ditions experienced life in a Hobbesian state of nature: an existence,
"solitary, poor[ ], nasty, brutish, and short. '' 33 Even those who es-
caped institutionalization were not necessarily free from legal con-
straint. Until 1973, Chicago prohibited persons who were "deformed"
and "unsightly" from exposing themselves to public view.3 4 In many
29. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
32. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 16, at 811-16 (describing use of almshouses for
custody of persons with disabilities, followed by use of institutions); see also Colin Barnes
& Mike Oliver, Disability: A Sociological Phenomenon Ignored by Sociologists, available at
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Barnes/soc % 20phenomenon. pdf
("[D]isabled people . . . were segregated from mainstream economic and social life and
incarcerated into a variety of institutions, including special schools, asylums, workhouses,
and long-stay hospitals created specifically for this purpose.").
33. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1651); see Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing filth, brutality, and malnutrition
at a state institution for people with mental retardation); N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (describing reports
of 1300 injuries, assaults, or fights in eight months at state institution for children with
mental retardation). Legal protections for institutionalized persons with disabilities were
long in coming and often inadequate when they arrived. The constitutional doctrine pro-
tecting the safety, habilitation, and medical rights of persons with disabilities in institutions
developed after those rights had been extended to people in prison; in fact, the reasoning
in the seminal case was that persons involuntarily confined without having committed a
crime should not be denied protections afforded convicts. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 315-16 (1982). Many courts refused to find rights to safety and habilitation when an
individual was voluntarily confined rather than civilly committed. See, e.g., Fialkowski v.
Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 464-67 (3d Cir. 1990). The Supreme
Court further ruled that basic statutory protections of institutionalized persons with disabil-
ities were unenforceable. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1981).
34. See Martha T. McCluskey, Note, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimi-
nation in Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863, 863 n.8 (1988) (citing Chicago Code § 36-
34 (1966) (repealed 1973)); see also Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to
Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARv. L. REv. 2035, 2035
n.2 (1987) (collecting examples of municipal "ugly laws").
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places, the law excluded children with disabilities from public
school.35 One statute imposed criminal penalties on parents if they
persisted in a demand for public school placement.36 In 1975, when
federal legislation finally required states receiving federal educational
funds to serve all school-aged children with disabilities, 1.75 million
children were not receiving any schooling, and an estimated 2.5 mil-
lion were in programs that did not meet their needs."
7
Eugenics, the pseudo-science of producing an optimal human
population, furnished an ideology that justified the exclusion of the
physically and mentally "unfit" from social life, through confinement,
sterilization, and even outright killing. 8 Courts operating under the
influence of this ideology approved the compelled sterilization of in-
dividuals on specious assertions that they had a propensity to pass dis-
abilities on to their offspring.39 Public officials declared that people
with disabilities had to be kept from mingling with others.4 ° In the
1930s, the German government went even further by initiating a pro-
35. See, e.g., Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ill. 1958) (holding that
the state is not required to provide education for mentally deficient children); Watson v.
City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864-65 (Mass. 1893) (entrusting to a school committee the
decision of whether a student's disability was so disruptive as to justify expulsion); State ex
rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 154-55 (Wis. 1919) (allowing schools to exclude
students whose presence was "harmful to the school and to the pupils," unless the decision
was unreasonable). Statutes permitting administrative exclusion of children with disabili-
ties from public school are collected and described in Richard C. Handel, The Role of the
Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHio
ST. L.J. 349, 351-52 (1975).
36. See Handel, supra note 35, at 35 (citing Act of May 18, 1965, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115-
65 (1966) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115-65 (Supp. 1974)).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-13 (1975).
38. See Weber, supra note 18, at 900-01 (discussing effects of eugenics).
39. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding sterilization of a woman
deemed feeble minded, and asserting that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough."). Buck itself was a sham case in which the attorney for Carrie Buck was in league
with the eugenicists. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 56 (1985). Attitudes underlying the case have not gone
away. See Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 122, 123 (1993) (describing existing legal procedures for compulsory sterili-
zation that fail to protect rights of women with mental disabilities); Robert L. Hayman, Jr.,
Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1202,
1203 (1990) (challenging prevalent presumption that persons with mental retardation are
unfit as parents).
40. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 393, 400-01 (1991) ("In virtually every state, in inexorable fashion, people
with disabilities-especially children and youth-were declared by state lawmaking bodies
to be 'unfitted for companionship with other children,' a 'blight on mankind' whose very
presence in the community was 'detrimental to normal' children, and whose 'mingling...
with society' was 'a most baneful evil.'") (footnotes omitted) (quoting statutes and govern-
mental reports).
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gram involving the systematic killing of individuals with disabilities,
which the Nazi government termed "euthanasia."'" In the United
States and elsewhere, infants with disabilities were often denied medi-
cal treatment in hospitals and left to die,42 or were killed outright.43
As late as the 1940s, American medical experts defended the practice
of killing people with disabling conditions, citing the benefits to the
rest of the population.44
Justice Thurgood Marshall exposed the history of legally en-
forced segregation of people with developmental disabilities in his
partial dissent in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.45 He
began by discussing eugenics and the ideology of segregation:
[T] he mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy and
tragic history" . . . of segregation and discrimination that can
only be called grotesque. During much of the 19th century,
mental retardation was viewed as neither curable nor danger-
ous and the retarded were largely left to their own devices.
By the latter part of the century and during the first decades
of the new one, however, social views of the retarded under-
went a radical transformation. Fueled by the rising tide of
Social Darwinism, the "science" of eugenics, and the extreme
xenophobia of those years, leading medical authorities and
others began to portray the "feeble-minded" as a "menace to
society and civilization ... responsible in a large degree for
many, if not all, of our social problems."46
41. Hugh Gregory Gallagher, "Slapping Up Spastics": The Persistence of Social Attitudes To-
ward People with Disabilities, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 401, 402 (1995) ("In the late 1930s and
throughout World War II, physicians of Germany's medical establishment ... systemati-
cally killed their severely disabled and chronically mentally ill patients .... The officially
sanctioned killing program was authorized by Hitler in 1939 at the request of leading
figures of the German medical establishment.... The program's proponents advanced
various arguments for its justification: compassion, eugenics, economics, racial purity.");
Stanley S. Herr, The International Significance of Disability Rights, 93 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC.
332, 332 (2000) ("By the 1930s . . . the killing of German and Austrian nationals with
disabilities through so-called euthanasia programs, suggested precursors to the genocide
and fascist barbarisms to come.").
42. This practice continued at least into the 1930s. See Cook, supra note 40, at 403 n.74
(collecting extensive primary sources).
43. In his autobiography, Oliver Sacks records the practice of the matron under his
physician mother's supervision drowning newborns with anencephaly, spina bifida, or
other birth defects. OLIVER SACKS, UNCLE TUNGSTEN 240-41 (2001).
44. See Cook, supra note 40, at 403 n.74 (citing a 1942 article that proposed "euthanasia
for hopelessly mentally defective individuals").
45. 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
46. Id. at 461-62 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting, in first sentence, Univ. of
Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (plurality opinion) and in last sentence, H.
Goddard, The Possibilities of Research as Applied to the Prevention of Feeblemindedness, PROC.
[VOL. 63:162
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This ideology had very real consequences for the individuals with
disabilities that the authorities sought to isolate from the general
population:
A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation
soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and
indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive
custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded
for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and
"nearly extinguish their race." Retarded children were cate-
gorically excluded from public schools, based on the false
stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported
need to protect nonretarded children from them. State laws
deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."47
The technology of the industrial revolution reinforced the segre-
gation that the era's "the race is to the swift"4 8 ideology supported.
Industrial production techniques fostered segregation by splitting the
tasks involved in production among workers, and by eliminating work-
ers who could not keep up with machines or other workers in the
same production process.49 "Industrialization brought policies that
segregated disabled people, removing them from their indigenous
communities, placing many of them in institutions .... .""
NAT'L CONF. CHARITIES & CORRECTION 307 (1915)). As Justice Marshall pointed out, peo-
ple with developmental disabilities were viewed as a threat to society, as were African-
Americans:
Books with tides such as "The Menace of the Feeble Minded in Connecticut"
(1915), issued by the Connecticut School for Imbeciles, became commonplace.
See C. Frazier, (Chairman, Executive Committee of Public Charities Assn. of
Pennsylvania), The Menace of the Feeble-Minded In Pennsylvania (1913); W.
Fernald, The Burden of Feeble-Mindedness (1912) (Mass.); Juvenile Protection
Association of Cincinnati, The Feeble-Minded, Or the Hub to Our Wheel of Vice
(1915) (Ohio). The resemblance to such works as R. Shufeldt, The Negro: A
Menace to American Civilization (1907), is striking, and not coincidental.
Id. at 462 n.8.
47. Id. at 462-63 (footnotes omitted) (quoting, in second sentence, A. MooRE, THE
FEEBLE-MINDED IN NEW YORK 3 (1911), in last sentence, Act. of Apr. 3, 1920, ch. 210, § 17,
1920 Miss. LAWS 288, 294). See generally Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability,
Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive
Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 109 (2001-02) ("Marshall's
partial dissent [in Cleburne] took the history of oppression of disabled people to be a lens
that inexorably distorted assessments of their differences.").
48. John Davidson (1857-1909), War Song, available at http://www.theotherpages.org/
poems/2001/davidson0102.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2003).
49. See Hahn, supra note 16, at 177 (stating that factories were designed to accommo-
date nondisabled workers).
50. See Richard K. Scotch, American Disability Policy in the Twentieth Century, in THE NEW
DISABILITY HISTORY 375, 389 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001).
2004]
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B. Now
The attitudes remain, and in more than vestigial form. In a
speech just a few years ago, the President of Boston University re-
ferred to students with learning disabilities as a "plague."5 t In the late
1980s, the judge in the trial of the tort action over birth defects attrib-
uted to the drug Bendectin excluded all plaintiffs with visible deformi-
ties from the courtroom on the ground that their appearance would
improperly influence the jury.5 2 The legislative history of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act reports an instance in which children with
Down's syndrome were kept out of a private zoo on the belief that
their appearance would bother the animals.5 3 Employers have denied
jobs to people with cerebral palsy54 and arthritis55 because of the sup-
posed discomfort that co-workers or customers would experience
from looking at them. Disability rights activists have felt compelled to
array themselves against Peter Singer, the Princeton philosopher who
argues that the killing of infants with severe disabilities is consistent
with principles of morality.
56
Current economic conditions do not necessarily help foster inte-
gration and replace segregationist attitudes with more progressive
ones. Post-industrial techniques have, at best, an equivocal effect.
The movement toward high technology in many jobs should make
them easier to perform by people with mobility impairments and
51. SeeGuckenbergerv. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 312 (D. Mass. 1997). Note that
President Jon Westling was using the term "plague" to describe the students, not the
condition.
52. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988). Not all judges share
this attitude. See, e.g., Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that litigants with physical abnormalities should not be discriminated against with re-
spect to presence in court).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990).
54. See 135 CONG. REC. S4994 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)
(reporting the experiences of two of the Senator's constituents who were denied jobs for
which they were qualified because "fellow employees would not be comfortable working
with a person with a disability," and because the director believed "handicapped persons
... were difficult to work with").
55. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (discussing a similar case where a woman was denied a
position at a college because administrators believed that "normal students shouldn't see
her").
56. See, e.g., Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations: or How I Spent One Day
as a Token Cripple at Princeton University, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 6, at 50 (describing the
passionately negative reaction to Singer among members of disability rights community).
Singer articulates his views on infanticide in a number of texts. See, e.g., HELGA KUHSE &
PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LrvE?: THE PROBLEM OF HANDICAPPED INFANTS 189-97
(1985) (asserting that killing infants with disabilities is moral); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIB-
ERATION 18 (2d ed. 1990) (equating the killing of animals to the killing of infants with
brain damage).
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some other physical disabilities.57 The barriers to employment for
some people with sensory impairments may also diminish as techno-
logical devices enhance communication." Nevertheless, the move-
ment toward more technological jobs may further decrease the
opportunities available to workers with mental retardation and other
developmental disabilities, or may result in the shunting of those
workers to an ever greater degree into low-level jobs in maintenance
and landscaping.59 Machines increasingly are doing the repetitive
production activities that were once the province of specialized work-
shops for individuals with developmental disabilities.6"
Architectural, communication, and other barriers in the environ-
ment also continue to contribute to the segregation of people with
disabilities. 6 ' If barriers prevent individuals from riding the bus, en-
tering stores, restaurants, and government buildings, or making use of
places of public entertainment, people with impairments will remain
invisible, hidden out of sight.62
Segregation strengthens the negative attitudes that led to en-
forced separation in the first place.63 Gordon Allport's classic study of
57. See A] Cavalier, The Application of Technology in the Classroom and Workplace: Unvoiced
Premises and Ethical Issues, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 129, 130-33 (Alan
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (discussing technological advancements that may be bene-
ficial to individuals with disabilities in the workplace).
58. See iL at 130-31 (describing devices that assist individuals with hearing
impairments).
59. Cf Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22
Soc. ScL. J. 87, 91 (1985) (focusing on the possible integration of persons with physical
disabilities through computers and labor saving devices); Cavalier, supra note 57, at 130-33
(discussing the impact of technology for individuals with physical, but not mental,
disabilities).
60. This development is not necessarily bad, for specialized or sheltered workshops
that segregate workers with disabilities and frequently provide little in the way of an entry
point to better paying, better integrated work. See Harlan Hahn, Towards A Politics of Disa-
bility, Institute on Independent Living, at http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/hahn
2.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) ("[D]isabled persons often are trained by rehabilitation
programs for positions in the secondary labor market which provide few opportunities for
increase[d] income or upward mobility."). Nevertheless, ifjobs that people with develop-
mental disabilities can do are not available in other settings, the result of the substitution
of machines is a net loss in employment.
61. See Simon Ungar, Disability and the Built Environment, Distance Education Centre,
University of Sheffield, at http://fhis.gcal.ac.uk/PSY/sun/LectureNotes/city/city.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (cataloging physical and sensory barriers in the environment
and the effects of isolating persons with disabilities).
62. Hahn, supra note 60, at 94 ("Disabled citizens have confronted barriers in architec-
ture, transportation, and public accommodations which have excluded them from com-
mon social, economic, and political activities even more effectively than the segregationist
policies of racist governments.").
63. See Ungar, supra note 61 (" [I] t should also be clear that these exclusions themselves
help to reproduce negative attitudes to disabled people.").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the social psychology of prejudice concluded that individuals without
contact with members of a racial or other out-group typically hold
members of the minority in low esteem.64 Casual contact may simply
reinforce the stereotypes, because members of the majority group un-
consciously seek out information that confirms their pre-existing
views.65 Nevertheless, prejudice declines substantially when casual
contact gives way to closer acquaintance, 66 and especially, to engage-
ment in activity as equals in pursuit of a common goal.67 As Martha
Field has observed, "One reason many people are so fearful of-even
repulsed by-persons with handicaps . . . is that they have never
known such persons and have not seen them functioning in the com-
munity."6" Harlan Hahn, a political scientist who is a noted scholar of
disability issues, attributes the desire to segregate to the repugnance
toward disabled bodies and the fear of someday being disabled.69
This anxiety flourishes when people without disabilities lack any real
experience as an equal-as co-workers, classmates, or daily acquaint-
ances-with people who have disabilities.7" Research confirms that
school children with disabilities, who, as noted below, are pervasively
segregated from other children,7 are vastly lower in social prestige
than the other students.72 Samuel Bagenstos combines the environ-
mental model of disability, i.e., that disability is located in the social
and physical environment that fails to adapt to persons with impair-
ments, with ideas about the subordination that society imposes, and
64. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 264 (1954).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 268.
67. Id. at 276-78.
68. Martha A. Field, Killing "the Handicapped"-Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 79, 117 (1993).
69. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 607, 631-32 (2002) ("Harlan Hahn... asserts that able-bodied society feels 'existen-
tial anxiety' towards the disabled."). The combination of repugnance to disabled bodily
difference and fear of also attaining such variation in the future, according to Hahn, result
in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream." Stein,
supra, at 632; see also David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 183-84 (discussing psychological
origins of negative attitudes toward persons with disabilities).
70. Several years before the passage of the ADA, the United States Civil Rights Commis-
sion linked forced separation and the negative attitudes that lead to discrimination: "His-
torically, society has tended to isolate and segregate handicapped people. Despite some
improvements, particularly in the last two decades, discrimination against handicapped
persons continues to be a serious and pervasive social problem." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 159 (1983).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98 (describing segregated educational settings
for children with disabilities).
72. See Paul Sale & Doris M. Carey, The Sociometric Status of Students with Disabilities in a
Full-Inclusion Schoo4 62 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 6, 16-17 (1995) (reporting attitude study).
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concludes that the stigma society attaches to disability is disability's
defining characteristic.7"
C The Goal of Integration in the ADA
Just as segregation feeds on itself by constantly reinforcing the
fear of the unknown, carefully structured integration creates positive
attitudes. Dick Thornburgh, the Attorney General at the time of the
adoption of the ADA, commented: "Attitudes can only be reshaped
gradually. One of the keys to this reshaping process is to increase
contact between and among people with disabilities and their more
able-bodied peers." 4  Psychological studies support Thornburgh's
point. Timothy Cook, a legendary disability rights advocate, surveyed
the literature and declared: "The research data shows, without doubt,
what should be obvious, that prejudice is lessened through
integration."7
The ADA is a thoroughly integrationist statute.76 The second of
the nine findings in the preamble to the ADA states that "historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and perva-
sive problem. 77 Cook wrote that the "findings make it as plain as it
could be that the primary evil addressed in the ADA was the segrega-
tion that continues to impose an isolated, denigrated existence upon
persons with disabilities. '7'  The Senate Report on the bill that be-
came the ADA declared that "[o]ne of the most debilitating forms of
discrimination is segregation imposed by others . . . ."" Senator Ken-
nedy, who was instrumental in the passage of the law, averred: "The
Americans with Disabilities Act will end this American apartheid. It
73. Bagenstos, supra note 27, at 438-39.
74. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 202 (1989). Congres-
sional leaders agreed with this proposition. See 136 CONG. REc. H2603 (daily ed. May 22,
1990) (statement of Rep. Collins) ("If we have learned any lessons in the last 30 years, it is
that only by breaking down barriers between people can we dispel the negative attitudes
and myths that are the main currency of oppression.").
75. Cook, supra note 40, at 441 (discussing studies showing that integration improves
attitudes).
76. For a more elaborate development of this characterization, see Weber, supra note
18, at 903.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2) (2000).
78. Cook, supra note 40, at 398; see also id. at 419 ("First and foremost, Congress ex-
pressed in the ADA its determination that 'segregation,' 'isolation,' and 'institutionaliza-
tion' of persons with disabilities were 'forms of discrimination' to be disestablished.")
(footnotes omitted) (quoting ADA Title II provisions).
79. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989).
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will roll back the unthinking and unacceptable practices by which dis-
abled Americans today are segregated, excluded, and fenced off from
fair participation in our society ..... ,'o Provisions of the Act prohibit
segregation in employment,"' public services, 2  and public
accommodations.83
The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring"4
shows the primacy of integration as an ADA goal, and the link be-
tween exclusion and discrimination. However, it also demonstrates
the limits of the ADA as a means to reaching the goal of integration.
In Olmstead, two women with mental retardation and mental illness
lived for long periods of time in institutionalized settings despite the
conclusion of treating professionals that they could be served in com-
munity-based residential programs, where they would have more free-
dom and could be more closely integrated into society.85 The Court
upheld a regulation issued pursuant to the authority granted in the
ADA, which provides that public entities must administer services and
programs in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
people with disabilities.86 The Court found that "[u]njustified isola-
tion . .. is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.
8 7
The Court, however, also ruled that, in implementing the regulation,
the courts must consider, in view of the resources available to the
state, not only the cost of providing community-based care to the indi-
viduals making the claim, but also the range of services the state pro-
vides to others with mental disabilities, and the state's obligation to
provide equal services to all.88 The Court revealed its anxiety over the
financial problems states may have in maintaining institutions for indi-
viduals who require intensive care while paying for community-based
placements for others.89 The Court also explicitly approved waiting
lists, as long as they move "at a reasonable pace."9 ° The Court's deci-
80. 135 CONG. REc. S4993 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2000).
82. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2002). Title II's substantive provisions, apart from a gen-
eral prohibition on discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000), are found in regulations
authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)-(b) (2000).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(iii)-(iv) (2000).
84. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
85. Id. at 593-94.
86. Id. at 597 (upholding 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 604 (applying "fundamental-alteration" defense provided by 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b) (7)).
89. See id. (stating that "the ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase out
institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk.").
90. Id. at 606.
[VOL. 63:162
2004] INTEGRATION, HARASSMENT, AND THE ADA
sion echoed Brown v. Board of Education 11 in its subordination of the
integration ideal to the supposed needs of governments engaged in
illegal segregation.92
Lower court case law displays an even greater ambivalence toward
integration. Some courts have upheld integration claims. In Caruso v.
Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Centre,93 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit required that a lawn area outside a concert arena be
made accessible to wheelchair users, citing the obligation to provide
public accommodations in the most integrated setting appropriate to
the needs of the individual.94 Other courts, however, have denied de-
mands for integration. McLaughlin v. Holt Public Schools Board of Educa-
tion95 is one of many cases rejecting the proposition that a child with
disabilities should be educated at a school in the child's neighbor-
hood, favoring instead the school system's preference to provide ser-
vices at a concentrated site with fewer opportunities for mixing with
children without disabilities.96 Tyler v. Ispat Inland Inc.97 upheld an
employer's decision to separate an employee with mental illness from
his original worksite and place him in a new location, despite his claim
that the separation from the original site segregated him on account
of his disability.9"
91. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (allowing delay in implementation of racial integration in
public schools for administrative difficulties and stating that integration was to be imple-
mented "with all deliberate speed").
92. Cook collected studies supporting his contention that "virtually all people with disa-
bilities can and should live and receive services they need in community settings." Cook,
supra note 40, at 442, 442-445 (citing numerous studies demonstrating that individuals with
disabilities can live successfully in integrated settings). The array of authority supporting
this contention is indeed overwhelming. Institutions remain open primarily because of
politics. State hospitals provide badly needed jobs and other patronage to the small towns
in which they are located. Needless to say, political considerations should not establish a
defense to deinstitutionalization.
93. 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 732.
95. 320 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2003).
96. See id. at 673-74; see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618 (6th Cir.
1990); DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989). Courts have gen-
erally failed to enforce the regulation providing that the placement of a child with disabili-
ties must be "as close as possible to the child's home." 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a) (3) (2003);
see, e.g., Murray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 51 F.3d 921, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1995).
The courts have a mixed record applying the least restrictive environment duty in public
school cases. See MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 9:3-9:9
(2d ed. 2002) (reviewing cases in which courts assess the least restrictive environment
duty).
97. 245 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2001).
98. Id. at 974. The court opined that the no-segregation rule was satisfied when the
worker was moved to a setting that included workers without disabilities. Id. at 973-74.
Nevertheless, the same court held that an employee with a mental illness had stated an
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No comprehensive records are kept on the degree to which indi-
viduals with disabilities are segregated or integrated in the workforce,
although it is known that work in segregated settings remains a fea-
ture of life for many people with disabilities, particularly those with
mental retardation.99 Frequently, the only alternative to sheltered
work is no work at all. Large numbers of persons with disabilities are
unemployed and, therefore, separated from the world of work alto-
gether. The latest statistics, which unfortunately are somewhat dated,
show that 72.2 percent of working-age Americans, who report health
conditions or impairments that limit their ability to work, do not have
jobs. 00 As the compiler of the statistics notes, "For this group, em-
ployment would be the most direct route to greater social integration
and fuller participation in mainstream life."' Confounding any con-
trary stereotypes, the vast majority of individuals with disabilities who
are unemployed want to work.10 2 Unemployment contributes to the
high degree of impoverishment among people with disabilities, a pov-
erty rate about three times that of the general population.'
ADA claim when he was transferred to a location in which he had to work alone and was
forbidden to speak to anyone. Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (7th Cir.
1998).
99. See L. Scott Muller et al., Labor-Force Participation and Earnings of SSI Disability Recipi-
ents: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Times Series Approach to the Behavior of Individuals, Soc. SECURITY
BULL., Mar. 1, 1996, at 22, 34-36 (discussing prevalence of sheltered and supported em-
ployment among recipients of government Supplemental Security Income benefits).
100. See Kaye, supra note 27. Kaye provides further details:
Employment rates vary greatly according to the nature and severity of the disabil-
ity. According to 1994-95 data from the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP), people with mobility impairments are the group least likely to be
employed (roughly three-quarters do not have jobs), followed by blind people
and those with mental retardation:
-only 22.0% of working-age wheelchair users and 27.5% of cane, crutch, or
walker users are employed;
-only 25.5% of people unable to climb stairs, 22.5% of those unable to walk
three city blocks, and 27.0% of those unable to lift and carry 10 pounds have
jobs;
-30.8% percent of blind people ("unable to see words or letters") work, while
43.7% of those with visual impairment are employed;
-only 35.1% of those with mental retardation have jobs;
-among those with mental or emotional disorders or impairments, 41.3% are
employed;
-64.4% of working-age adults with hearing impairments hold jobs, while 59.7%
of those "unable to hear normal conversation" are employed.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. ("In a 1994 Harris poll, 79% of those without jobs said that they would prefer to
be working.").
103. See Mitchell P. LaPlante et al., Disability Statistics Abstract Number 11: Disability and
Employment (1996), Disability Statistics Center, available at http://www.dsc.ucsf.edu/UCSF/
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Educational settings manifest separation of children with disabili-
ties, as the McLaughlin case exemplifies.1"4 In 1998-99, 80.8 percent of
children ages 6-11, 72.3 percent of children ages 12-17, and 58.8 per-
cent of children ages 18-21 receiving public special education services
were educated outside the general education classroom more than 40
percent of the school day.' °5 More than 20 percent of all children
with disabilities were in separate environments for over 60 percent of
the day.116 Of children with mental retardation, 51 percent spent 60
percent or more of the day isolated from their nondisabled peers.
10 7
Many students with disabilities eventually isolate themselves from their
classmates in a more permanent fashion: Children with disabilities
have dropout rates three times those of other children.'
08
II. THE ROLE OF HARASSMENT IN PERPETUATING SEGREGATION
Harassment is a special case of exclusion. Harassment operates
to perpetuate segregation. It prevents people from taking advantage
of the right to work, to be educated, or to use public services in an
integrated fashion. It induces people to rely on segregated settings in
order to obtain respite from mistreatment. Mental and sensory im-
pairments are especially stigmatized,10 9 and harassment is particularly
effective at keeping those with mental retardation and other mental
conditions out of the workplace, out of integrated school settings, and
pdf/Abstractll.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (comparing rates of poverty of 30.0% for
working-age persons with work disabilities and 10.2% for those without work disabilities).
104. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing McLaughlin).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 111-3 to 5 (2001).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 111-5.
108. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE TRANSITION EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG PEOPLE WITH DISABILI-
TIES: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION STUDENTS 2-9 (1993).
109. The civil rights model of disability, which faults the human environment for the
difficulty of integration, does not apply as easily to problems of discrimination against per-
sons with pervasive developmental disability and other mental disorders, and, therefore, is
less effective at overcoming the stigma that attaches to people with those disabilities. One
observer notes:
Scholars in disability studies point out not only that cultural assumptions shape
our perceptions of disability but also that social arrangements actually shape what
is considered a disability. The availability of services, the structures of buildings,
the distribution of income, and many other factors all transform human variation
into disability. Scholars have had a harder time applying this model to people
with severe intellectual disabilities. It is all too easy to see people with severe
disabilities as automatically excluded from society.
Janice A. Brockley, Martyred Mothers and Merciful Fathers, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY,
supra note 50, at 293, 294 (footnotes omitted).
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generally out of sight and mind. 10 Discussing opinion studies regard-
ing acceptance of people with learning disabilities and mental and
sensory impairments, Wendy Wilkinson and Lex Frieden concluded:
The hierarchy of acceptance depends on the particular type
of disability. Individuals with hidden, unfamiliar, or more
stigmatized disabilities face greater barriers in the workplace
and in society. The unemployment rate among people with
psychiatric disabilities is estimated to be 85 percent, signifi-
cantly higher than the rate for individuals with physical
disabilities. 1 1
The law rejects the idea of forced separation to keep the subjects
of harassment from being harassed. That would truly be a regression
to the model of disability that locates the problem in the person with
the disability, rather than in the social and physical environment. In
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,l"2 the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that protecting individuals with mental retar-
dation from harassment could constitute a legitimate state interest for
purposes of equal protection analysis if the result was the exclusion of
the residents from their chosen site for a group home.' The Court
declared that "denying a permit based on such vague, undifferenti-
ated fears is... permitting some portion of the community to validate
what would otherwise be an equal protection violation."1 4
Other cases demonstrate how harassment drives people out of in-
tegrated employment and mainstreamed educational settings, and il-
lustrate how few of those people receive remedies from the courts,
despite the principle that the law should permit individuals to assert
their right to an integrated environment. This reality pertains to both
work and school.
110. See infra notes 121-125, 141-145, and 180-196.
111. Wendy Wilkinson & Lex Frieden, Glass-Ceiling Issues in Employment of People with Disa-
bilities, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 68, 74 (Peter
David Blanck ed., 2000) (citations omitted); see also Mollie Weighner Marti & Peter David
Blanck, Attitudes, Behavior, and ADA Title I, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra, at 358 ("Across broad categories of disabilities, studies have
established a fairly uniform hierarchy of reactions to different types of disabilities. Addic-
tive conditions (e.g., alcoholism, drug use), psychological conditions (e.g., mental retarda-
tion, mental illness), and neurological conditions (e.g., epilepsy, cerebral palsy) are viewed
most negatively . . . .") (citations omitted).
112. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
113. Id. at 446-47.
114. Id. at 449; see also Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55
(N.D. Ala. 1981) (rejecting the school board's argument that the child should be sent to a
separate school to avoid ridicule, and ordering specialized services for the child).
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A. Work15
Several cases of workplace harassment are illustrative. Roger Lee
Statzer had a developmental speech disorder that left his speech
about 50 percent intelligible."1 6 He alleged, and testimony from his
supervisors established, that co-workers at his carpentry and mainte-
nance job routinely ridiculed him.1 17 His supervisors knew about the
harassment, but failed to testify to anything that they did to stop it. 1
8
The attitude of his top boss was revealed by his comment to Statzer
that "if [he] didn't like the job, [he] could quit." '19 The court re-
jected Statzer's claim of hostile environment disability harassment,
ruling on summary judgment that the constant ridicule was as a mat-
ter of law insufficient to meet the standard for a violation of the ADA,
and that the supervisors had no responsibility to stop the harassment,
though they were fully aware of it.
120
Ricky Casper had a mental impairment that reduced his ability to
learn. 12 1 Supervisors at his maintenance and assembly job derided
him as being stupid, and forced him to work while co-workers laughed
at him.122 He received the nicknames "Rick Retardo" and "dumb
ass." 123 A supervisor asked him why he had his job because "you can't
read or write or do math." 124 The court granted summary judgment
to his employer on the ADA harassment claim, holding that the com-
ments and acts "could not amount to an objectively hostile work envi-
ronment based on disability."
125
Marge McConathy was a benefits manager who developed a disor-
der of the jaw, temporomandibular joint disease, which required her
to undergo multiple surgeries.126 Her supervisor told her that she
should not be making such extensive use of her health benefits, told
115. This topic is developed at length in Weber, Workplace Harassment Claims, supra note
3.
116. Statzer v. Town of Lebanon, No. 1:00CV00128, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7747, at *2
(W.D. Va.June 4, 2001). For this case and the other cases discussed in this section and the
next, the assumption is made that the plaintiffs' allegations were true, an assumption the
courts made despite reaching their conclusions.
117. Id. at *14.
118. Id. at *14-15.
119. Id. at *2-3 (alteration in original).
120. Id. at *15.
121. Casper v. Gunite Corp., No. 3:98-CV-173RM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13554, at *4
(N.D. Ind.June 11, 1999).
122. Id. at *14.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id. at *11.
126. McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
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her staff to stop communicating with her, excluded her from business
meetings, and refused to acknowledge her presence when she was
with him. 127 Ultimately, she was fired in a reorganization. 12' The
court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on her disability harass-
ment claim, finding her allegations insufficient to meet the test of per-
vasive harassment. 129
What is remarkable in all these cases is that the workers contin-
ued in their jobs (or tried to do so),"3O despite harassment that would
drive a reasonable person to quit. Thus, the plaintiffs in these cases
stand for the untold numbers of workers who leave integrated job set-
tings in response to campaigns of harassment that their supervisors
conduct or do nothing to stop.
B. Education 1
A representative case regarding public schooling is that of Robert
Kubistal, a seventh grader with an undiagnosed visual impairment. 32
His teacher nicknamed him "butthead," and said she wanted to re-
move his eyes and give them to a student who would work harder.1 33
After his mother complained to Robert's principal and the principal
told the teacher to apologize, the teacher called Robert before the
class, knelt, and in an exaggerated voice said, "I'm so sorry, Bobby!"' 34
She then turned to the class and put her finger in her throat to mimic
gagging.135 Sometime later, after the visual impairment was discov-
ered, the principal came to the classroom and built Robert an "isola-
tion chamber"1 36 out of movable bookcases. Robert sat in the
isolation chamber every day for weeks, even during his lunch period,
despite his mother's complaints.' 37 Robert finally graduated from
grade school, though he had never been assigned eighth grade
work.1 3' At graduation, the marshal initially left out Robert's name,
then looked at Robert's mother, giggled, and said, "Oh, Robert Kubis-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 561.
129. Id. at 563-64.
130. Id. at 561; Statzer v. Town of Lebanon, No. 1:00CV00128, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7747, at *3-5 (W.D. Va. June 4, 2001); Casper, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13554, at *7-10.
131. This topic is developed at length in Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3.
132. Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
9, 1999).
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *5.
137. Id. at *5-6.
138. Id. at *7.
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tal."' 39 Robert developed depression, bed-wetting, and a loss of inter-
est in school from these experiences. 4 °
Another case of educational harassment is that of Charlie F., a
fourth grader with attention deficit disorder, who had frequent panic
attacks.1 4' At the end of each week, his teacher held sessions with the
class in which she asked the students to vent their feelings. 142 She
routinely asked them to talk about Charlie, "and they all too willingly
obliged, leading to humiliation, fistfights, mistrust, loss of confidence
and self-esteem, and disruption of Charlie's educational progress."' 43
When Charlie's parents learned what was happening (the teacher had
instructed the students to keep the sessions secret) , 144 they moved
him to another school, but children from the seventh grade class still
harassed him when they saw him on the street.
145
Both Kubistal and Charlie F were dismissed on the ground that
the parents bringing suit failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under the federal special education law, 146 even though the plaintiffs
were seeking damages, a form of relief the administrative decision
maker could not provide, 47 and the children were no longer in the
schools where the harm took place. 141 In both instances, the ultimate
result of the harassment was the child's withdrawal from school, either
a loss of interest in school in general, or a physical withdrawal from
the school where the harassment occurred.14 9 The harassment
worked to drive the student with disabilities out of the integrated edu-
cational setting.
Disability harassment causes exclusion, and exclusion is the defi-
nition of segregation. 5 ° Scholars of sex discrimination law have rec-
ognized a similar connection between sexually harassing behavior and
the continued exclusion of women from the male preserves of the
workplace, an exclusion that frustrates women's efforts to integrate
139. Id.
140. Id. at *8.
141. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 1996). This account is taken
from the plaintiffs' allegations reported in the opinion.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 993 (remanding case with instructions to dismiss); Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98
C 3838, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *21 (dismissing the case).
147. Charlie F, 98 F.3d at 991; Kubistal 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *18-19.
148. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 990; Kubistal, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *7.
149. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 990; Kubistal, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *8.
150. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1358 (6th ed. 1990) (defining segregation as "[t]he act or
process of separation").
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job classifications typically held by males. 51 In one example, a writer
describes the steady abuse of female baseball umpires by co-workers as
a generally successful effort to keep women out of the job category,
and criticizes courts for ignoring the role of historical exclusion in
evaluating legal claims for harassment. 152
III. CURRENT LEGAL REMEDIES
The law has not been entirely silent on the subject of remedies
for workplace and educational harassment of people with disabilities.
Causes of action exist, though they are limited in the conduct they
cover and broad in the defenses they permit. Therefore the courts
are frequently ineffective in compensating for and deterring harass-
ment at work and school.
A. Work
Recently, several courts have upheld a remedy under Title I of
the ADA for hostile environment disability harassment. The claims
have relied on an analogy to sex and race harassment claims under
Title VII. In Fox v. General Motors Corp.,153 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed judgment on a jury verdict in
favor of an auto assembly plant worker whose back injuries were the
subject of ridicule and humiliation from supervisors and co-work-
ers.1 5 4 Supervisory personnel blocked efforts at accommodation, at
one point placing Fox at a work table that was so low that it made his
back condition worse.1 55 Fox's emotional distress manifested itself in
depression, anxiety, and thoughts of suicide. 56 In sustaining the
151. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686-87
(1998) (describing nonsexual harassment that operates to discourage women from taking
jobs traditionally held by men, and undermines their success in those jobs); see also Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169, 1205 (1998)
(characterizing harassment as a means of perpetuating masculine workplace norms); Kath-
erine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 696 (1997).
Franke explains that:
Sexual harassment also can be understood to enforce gender norms when it is
used to keep gender nonconformists in line. For example, women who work in
nontraditional jobs, such as the women who worked at theJacksonville Shipyards,
frequently experience extreme sexual harassment from their male coworkers as a
way of putting them in their "proper place."
Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Melissa M. Beck, Note, Fairness on the Field: Amending Title VII to Foster Greater Female
Participation in Professional Sports, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 241, 250-51, 256-64 (1994).
153. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 173-74, 181.
155. Id. at 173.
156. Id. at 174.
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claim, the court recognized that like Title VII, the ADA bars discrimi-
nation regarding terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 57
Indeed, Congress enacted the ADA after the Supreme Court had al-
ready determined that harassment violates the similar language of Ti-
tle VII.15
8
Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc.,'159 a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, affirmed the entry of judgment on a jury ver-
dict in favor of an employee with HIV. 160 Once her supervisor
learned about the infection, the supervisor shunned Flowers, no
longer going to lunch with her or socializing with her, but instead
eavesdropping on her. 6' The employer's president would not shake
her hand and avoided her.'62 Flowers had to undergo four drug tests
in a week, was written up twice and placed on probation, called
names, subjected to other petty humiliations, 163 then fired.164 The
Fifth Circuit emphasized the consistency in language and purpose be-
tween Title VII and the ADA, finding that the comparison supported a
claim for hostile environment disability harassment. 165  It further
ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for
the plaintiff.'66
The prominence of these cases obscures their atypicality, how-
ever. Although Fox, Flowers, and a number of other plaintiffs have
succeeded in surviving summary judgment or establishing liability
under Title VII-type tests, 1 67 the vast majority of claims have failed. As
157. Id at 176.
158. Id. at 175-76 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989)
and Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986)). The court overturned an
award of $4000 for unpaid overtime on the ground that it was inconsistent with the jury's
finding that General Motors had not intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. at
181. For commentary on this aspect of the decision, see Weber, Workplace Harassment
Claims, supra note 3, at 244 n.26.
159. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
160. Id. at 231, 239.
161. Id. at 236.
162. Id. at 237.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 233-34.
166. Id. at 236. The court, however, ruled that the plaintiff had not presented adequate
evidence of a specific emotional injury, and vacated the damages award, remanding for
entry of an award of nominal damages. Id. at 239. See generally Melinda Slusser, Note,
Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services: A Step in the Right Direction, 33 U. TOL. L.
REv. 713 (2002) (providing additional information regarding the case, and arguing that
flowers was correctly decided).
167. See Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC, 192 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438 (D. Md. 2002)
(denying defendant-employer's motion to dismiss); Swatzell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
No. CA 7:00-CV-139-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17733, at *27 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001)
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in Statzer, Casper, and McConathy, courts typically have ruled that the
harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive under standards
established by the Title VII sex and race harassment case law.' 68
(denying defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment); Armstrong v. Reno, 172
F. Supp. 2d 11, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (denying defendant-employer's motion for summary
judgment); Hiller v. Runyon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (denying defen-
dant-employer's motion for summary judgment); Arena v. AGIP USA, Inc., No. 95 CIV.
1529 (WHP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2578, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000) (denying motion
for summary judgment); Disanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1090 (JGK), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12382, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1998) (denying motion for summary judg-
ment); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying
defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment); Hudson v. Loretex Corp., No. 95-
CV-844 (RSP/RWS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4320, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997) (denying
motion to dismiss); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1112 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(denying defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment); Easley v. West, No. 93-
6751, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17789, at *31-32 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 1994) (denying defendant-
employer's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment); Davis v. York Int'l, Inc.,
No. HAR 92-3545, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17649, at *36-38 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 1993) (denying
defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment); see Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med.
Ctr., 286 F.3d 1040, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming verdict awarding $140,000 in dam-
ages for emotional distress caused by defendant-employer's decision to transfer plaintiff to
a position below her qualifications on the basis of her disability); see also Wheeler v. Mara-
thon Printing, Inc. 974 P.2d 207, 216-17 (Or. App. 1998) (upholding harassment claim on
basis of state law).
168. See Vollmert v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
trainer's unfavorable actions not so severe or pervasive as to establish a hostile environ-
ment); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing
damages award on the ground that knowledge of a disability did not motivate offensive
conduct); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding con-
duct not pervasive or severe enough to meet standard for liability); Wallin v. Minn. Dep't
of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding incidents isolated and not severe or
pervasive); Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming
summary judgment based on failure to allege facts sufficient to establish severity); Over-
street v. Calvert County Health Dep't, 187 F. Supp. 2d 567, 575 (D. Md. 2002) (granting
summaryjudgment on the ground that conduct did not constitute constructive discharge);
Georgy v. O'Neill, No. 00-CV-0660 (FB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4825, at *32-33 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2002) (granting summary judgment upon finding conduct not continuous and
pervasive); Richio v. Miami-Dade County, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1370-71 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(finding harassment not severe enough to constitute constructive discharge); Roeder v.
Hendricks Cmty. Hosp., No. IP 00-447-CH/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24619, at *34-35 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 7, 2001) (granting summary judgment on the ground that the conduct lacked
severity or pervasiveness); Griffin v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. 99-1344 REF, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13238, at *24 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2001) (granting summary judgment on the
ground that harassment is not based on disability); Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F.
Supp. 2d 529, 538 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (granting summaryjudgment on grounds of lack of
severity and pervasiveness); McCoy v. USF Dugan, Inc., No. 99-1504-JTM, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6980, at *9 (D. Kan. May 21, 2001) (granting summary judgment on the ground
that the conduct is not sufficiently severe); Johnston v. Henderson, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1341,
1361-62 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (granting summary judgment on grounds of severity and perva-
siveness of conduct); Jeseritz v. Henderson, No. CIV 99-1439 RHKJMM, 2001 WL 420164,
at *10 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2001) (granting summary judgment on the grounds that the con-
duct lacked severity or pervasiveness); Davis-Durnil v. Village of Carpentersville, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 575, 584-85 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding comments and other actions not sufficient
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B. Education
Title II of the ADA' 6 9 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973170 bar public schools from discriminating on the basis of disabil-
ity.171 These general prohibitions on discrimination, supplemented
by regulations that spell out various kinds of forbidden discrimina-
tion, 172 supply the basis of an analogy to Title VII with regard to hos-
tile environment claims. Provided that students can meet the
formidable severe-or-pervasive standard, their claims should be as suc-
cessful under Title II and section 504 as those of Fox and Flowers
under ADA Title I.
to constitute severe or pervasive conduct); Soledad v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 116
F. Supp. 2d 790, 801 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (grantingjudgment as a matter of law for defendant
and overturning jury verdict, ruling conduct not severe or pervasive); Comber v. Prologue,
Inc., Civ. No. JFM-99-2637, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *29 (D. Md. Sep. 28, 2000)
(granting summary judgment on ground of no pervasive hostility); Harshbarger v. Sierra
Pac. Power Co., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310-11 (D. Nev. 2000) (granting summary judg-
ment, finding conduct not severe or pervasive); Scherer v. GE Capital, No. 99-2172-GTV,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9152, at *19 (D. Kan. June 2, 2000) (granting summaryjudgment for
lack of severe or pervasive conduct); Fitch v. Solipsys Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (D.
Md. 2000) (granting summary judgment for failure to show severe or pervasive conduct);
Veal v. AT&T Corp., No. CIV. 99-0370, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3863, at *21-23 (E.D. La. Mar.
22, 2000) (granting summary judgment, finding conduct insufficiently pervasive and not
motivated by disability); Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., 48 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81
(D. Mass 1999) (granting summary judgment on grounds of lack of severity and official
knowledge); Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (granting summary judgment on the grounds that the environment was not shown
to be objectively abusive); Fosburg v. Lehigh Univ., No. Civ. A. 98-CV-864, 1999 WL 12445,
*6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1999) (finding on allegations of complaint that harassment did not
reach the level of hostility or pervasiveness needed to state a claim); Pomilio v. Wachtell
Lipton Rosen & Katz, No. 97 Civ. 2230 (MBM), 1999 WL 9843 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999)
(granting summary judgment on the grounds that comments were isolated); Hoffman v.
Brown, No. 1:96cv225-C, 1997 WL 827526 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 1997) (granting summary
judgment due to absence of evidence of impact of utterances on the work environment);
Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, 967 F. Supp. 653, 667 (D.P.R. 1997) (granting summary
judgment on basis of absence of evidence of pervasive hostility); Gray v. Ameritech Corp.,
937 F. Supp. 762, 771 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (granting summaryjudgment on grounds of absence
of knowledge of conduct by defendant); see also Robel v. Roundup Corp., 10 P.3d 1104,
1111 (Wash. App. 2000) (finding conduct not severe or pervasive; applying state law). The
cases rejecting claims on the grounds of severity or pervasiveness assume that a cause of
action exists under the ADA for a hostile work environment.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (covering services provided by state and local
government).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (covering federally assisted programs and activities). See
generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relation-
ship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Ameicans with Disabilities Act,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995) (comparing Title II and Section 504).
171. See Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1093-97 (discussing causes of action
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of Title II of the ADA).
172. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.41-104.43 (2002) (barring discrimination against disabled
postsecondary students in the context of admission and participation in school programs).
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An even closer analogy exists, however, to Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972. The Supreme Court has recently upheld
causes of action for sex harassment in public schools under Tide IX,
whose wording forbidding sex discrimination in educational pro-
grams receiving federal funds is identical to that forbidding disability
discrimination by recipients of federal money under section 504 (and
nearly identical to that forbidding discrimination by state and local
government under Tide II of the ADA).173 In Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education,174 the Supreme Court approved the award of dam-
ages against a school district for sexual harassment by a student's
peers.1 75 The Court said that liability exists when the responsible
school official or officials were deliberately indifferent to known be-
havior serious enough to have a systemic effect of denying the victim
equal access to an educational program or activity. 176 The Court
found the standard to be met when school officials know that a stu-
dent in the victim's school is engaging in sexually assaultive behavior,
but fail to do anything to stop the activity, and the child then sexually
assaults the plaintiff.1 7 7 In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dis-
trict,178 the Court applied a similar standard to teacher sexual harass-
ment of students. 179 These Title IX cases support the conclusion that
harassment motivated by a child's disability will produce liability
under section 504 or ADA Title II if the deliberate indifference stan-
dard is met and the harassment has a systemic effect of denying the
student with disabilities equal access to the educational program.
Using Tide II of the ADA as the basis of liability, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has upheld a cause of action for damages for disability harassment
173. Title II of the ADA recapitulates the section 504 prohibition against discrimination
by public entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("Subject to the provisions of this sub-
chapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be ex-
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."). The
definition of banned conduct in the ADA regulations echoes that found in the section 504
regulations. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2002) (ADA Title II), with 34 C.F.R. § 104.4
(2002) (section 504). Although there are some technical distinctions between the two
laws, the only difference for purposes of the current discussion is that Title II extends
section 504 coverage to any public educational agency that does not receive federal money.
See Weber, supra note 170, at 1109-16 (discussing the differences between section 504 and
ADA Title II).
174. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
175. Id. at 633.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 648.
178. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
179. Id. at 277.
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at school. Baird v. Rose'8 ° concerned a high school student named
Kristen Baird, who was diagnosed with severe depression and placed
on a counseling and medication program.'8 1 Her mother told per-
sonnel at Kristen's school about the diagnosis.'8 2 The following day,
the teacher in Kristen's musical performance class announced to the
entire class that Kristen would not be permitted to participate in the
next performance, gave her role to another student, and excluded her
from rehearsals.' 83 Kristen's mother confronted the teacher, who
gave various excuses at first but finally told her that she felt that indi-
viduals with depression "could not be counted on to meet their
responsibilities."184
When the mother submitted letters from a doctor and psycholo-
gist stating that Kristen was fit to perform and that her mental health
would deteriorate if she were excluded, the teacher tried to exclude
her on a previously unenforced policy against being absent from
class."8 5 The principal told the teacher that if she were to exclude
Kristen, she had to exclude all students who had been absent."8 6 So,
in Kristen's presence, the teacher announced to the class that, against
her will, she had to remove three other students from part of the per-
formance. 187 The teacher "then asked the class members if they un-
derstood why she was being forced to adhere to the strict attendance
policy, and other students commented that someone was taking ad-
vantage of the lax enforcement of the attendance policy."' 8 Humili-
ated, Kristen left the class crying uncontrollably and shaking; she
eventually needed sedation.'8 9 In the end, she was excluded from
many practices and all but a small part of the performance. 9 0 She
experienced sleeplessness, fear of humiliation, symptoms of physical
illness, and a decline in grades.'9 1
The court reversed the dismissal of Kristen's claim for damages
under Title II of the ADA.' 92 The court stated that to establish an
180. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
181. Id. at 464-65.
182. Id. at 465.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 465, 467-68.
186. Id. at 466.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 466.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 473. The Court affirmed the dismissal of a retaliation claim, but reversed the
dismissal of a pendent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
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ADA claim, the plaintiff had to sustain three elements: that the person
has a disability, is otherwise qualified for the benefit at issue, and "was
excluded from the benefit due to discrimination solely on the basis of
the disability." '93 The issue in dispute in Baird was whether the dis-
crimination was on the basis of the student's depression. 194 The court
ruled that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the charge of ab-
senteeism was a pretext,195 and that disability discrimination was a mo-
tivating factor for the adverse action.' 96
As with the successful workplace hostile environment cases, how-
ever, one should not mistake the favorable result in Baird for the tip of
the iceberg. The far more common result in cases of this type is the
fate of Robert Kubistal or Charlie F.'97 The plaintiffs' cases are dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 198
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL REMEDIES
It is my belief that additional remedies exist for plaintiffs to re-
dress instances of workplace and school harassment, and to deter
would-be harassers. By deterring harassment, application of these
remedies will contribute to the integration of persons with disabilities
into the mainstream of society.
193. Id. at 467.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 468, 468 n.6.
196. Id. at 470.
197. See Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98 C 3838, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *21 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 9. 1999); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying relief to
school children who were subjected to discrimination and harassment).
198. See Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993 (dismissing case in which teacher encouraged harass-
ment of student); Kubistal, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *21 (dismissing case involving
ridicule and humiliation by teacher of student with visual impairment); Franklin v. Frid, 7
F. Supp. 2d 920, 927 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (involving aide's physical and psychological abuse
of child with cerebral palsy); Shields v. Helena Sch. Dist. No. 1,943 P.2d 999, 1006 (Mont.
1997) (involving exclusion from trip, humiliation, and name-calling by teachers). In two
cases, courts used exhaustion as a basis to dismiss cases brought by parents for retaliation,
despite the obvious fact that the administrative process could provide no useful relief to
the parents. See Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming
grant of summaryjudgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Babicz v.
Sch. Bd., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of case, without
prejudice, for failing to exhaust administrative remedies). In Weber, the court relied on the
plaintiffs' failure to allege that exhaustion was burdensome or futile. Weber, 212 F.3d at 52-
53. In Babicz, the court appeared not to have been aware that Congress overruled Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), or perhaps it was not aware that the parent was suing on her
own behalf as well as that of her children. See Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1422 (citing Smith, 468
U.S. at 1009). See generally Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1134-41 (discussing
legislative overruling of Smith and its relevance to exhaustion issue).
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A. Work
In the workplace, the key source of protection is 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(b):' 99
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or
on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted
or protected by this chapter.200
The statute applies not just to the workplace. 21 As a provision of
Title V of the ADA, this statute applies to employment, to public ser-
vices such as schools, and to private sources of public accommodation
covered by ADA Tide 111.202 However, the Tide I (employment) regu-
lations make the provision particularly applicable because they con-
tain a provision amplifying the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the work settings:
It is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, harass, or inter-
fere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of...
any right granted or protected by this part.20 3
These statutory and regulatory provisions are distinct from the
ban on retaliation that is found in the other subsection of § 12203.204
Unlike the § 12203(a) retaliation provision and Title VII's language
with regard to race, sex, and national origin, § 12203(b) bars all coer-
cion, intimidation, threatening, and interference, without requiring
that the conduct amount to "discrimination. ' '20 5 The breadth of this
ban on coercion, intimidation, threatening and interference stands in
sharp contrast to the limited amount of harassment-only that which
is severe or pervasive-that the Supreme Court has found to be em-
199. For a more fully developed argument on this topic, see Weber, Workplace Harass-
ment Claims, supra note 3, at 250-65.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000).
201. Title V of the ADA contains a list of miscellaneous provisions that apply to the
entire Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12210.
202. Id.
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12(b) (2002) (emphasis added).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000) ("Retaliation. No person shall discriminate against
any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by
this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter."). Subsection
(b) is headed "Interference, coercion, or intimidation" rather than "Retaliation." Id.
§ 12203(b).
205. See id. § 12203(b) (omitting the requirement that conduct amount to
discrimination).
20041
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braced in the definition of discrimination.2 °6 Verbal abuse is a very
effective means of coercing, intimidating, and interfering with the ex-
ercise of the right to work on equal terms or with reasonable accom-
modations. Verbal threats, which are commonly found in cases that
courts throw out as inadequate to sustain a harassment claim,20 7 are
specific violations of § 12203(b).2 °8
The role of § 12203(b) should be to provide a remedy for con-
duct that coerces and intimidates workers with disabilities from com-
ing to work each day and performing the same jobs that workers
without disabilities do, that interferes with their exercise of the pri-
mary right under Tide I: To be employed with or without accommo-
dations in the mainstream of the workplace. 209 The statute renders
that coercive conduct actionable, even when the conduct does not
meet the judiciary's standard for severity or pervasiveness with regard
to discrimination in violation of § 12112(a) of the ADA, the general
anti-discrimination provision of Title I.
A comparison of the basis of Title VII harassment-as-part-of-dis-
crimination with § 12203(b) harassment, in the form of coercion, in-
timidation, threats, and interference, supports the point that the
severe-or-pervasive test is out of place in § 12203(b). The Supreme
Court has declared that the purpose of the Title VII test of severity or
pervasiveness is to eliminate cases regarding conduct that does not
alter the terms and conditions of employment. 210 Because bans on
coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference do not need to be
derived from a ban on something termed "discrimination," they do
not have to amount to a change in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment to be actionable. If they did, there would be no need for a sepa-
rate provision spelling them out. Harassment made actionable under
the Title I regulation applicable to § 12203(b) should be measured by
206. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (establishing a high standard
to meet for finding actionable harassment in Tide VII cases).
207. See, e.g., Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing physi-
cal threat against worker with disabilities).
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (prohibiting coercion, threats or interference with an in-
dividual's exercise or enjoyment of his or her protected rights).
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (barring employment discrimination against quali-
fied individuals with disabilities).
210. Hams, 510 U.S. at 21-22; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (noting that "simple teasing ... offliand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions
of employment'") (citations omitted). The Faragher Court added that "[w]e have made it
clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment." Id.
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the ordinary definition of the term: "to disturb persistently; tor-
ment,"21' "to annoy persistently."
212
B. School
As for harassment in public school settings, I have argued else-
where that causes of action for damages should exist for violations of
Title II of the ADA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Individ-
uals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as enforced under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and, in appropriate cases, the United States Constitu-
tion and the common law.213 Although some authorities might disa-
gree with my views about the propriety of any or all of those remedies
in any given case,214 the primary obstacle to plaintiffs in school harass-
ment cases is not an absence of grounds on which to sue, but rather
the presence of a defense of failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies under IDEA.
A correct reading of IDEA's exhaustion requirement does not re-
quire plaintiffs seeking damages for harassment to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. The general rule in cases brought under the statute
is that the due process hearing procedure must be exhausted before
the matter can go to court.2 1 5 IDEA provides:
[B]efore the filing of a civil action under . . . laws [such as
the Constitution, the ADA, or section 504] seeking relief that
is also available under [IDEA], the procedures [for adminis-
trative hearings and appeals] shall be exhausted to the same
211. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 870 (2d ed. 1987).
212. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 529 (10th ed. 1993). Similarly, coer-
cion, intimidation, threats, and interference should be given the ordinary meanings these
terms have, rather than converted into terms of art. Courts construing federal statutory
provisions similar to § 12203(b) have given the words broad, common-sense definitions.
See Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1093-1101 (discussing harassment case law).
This definition excludes trivial or inconsequential conduct, but covers activity that would
not meet the Title VII-style severe-or-pervasive test. See id. at 1097-1100 (discussing appro-
priate and inappropriate applications of § 12203(b)).
213. Weber, School Harassment, supra note 3, at 1093-1134 (discussing causes of action for
harassment). Claims also lie under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), under the same analysis that
applies to the employment cases. See id. at 1097 (discussing claims under § 12203(b)).
214. See, e.g., Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding no
claim for damages under § 1983 for violations of IDEA); see also Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d
524, 532 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (precluding § 1983 action for "the more general denial of a
free appropriate public education"); Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983
Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 465, 520 (2002) (arguing that
the legislative intent behind IDEA does not support damage claims).
215. See generally WEBER, supra note 96, § 21.8 (discussing administrative exhaustion in
special education cases).
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extent as would be required had the action been brought
under [IDEA]. 216
Although Congress intended IDEA's exhaustion requirement to
contain exceptions in a significant number of instances, 217 many
courts have failed to understand the congressional message.218 In
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1415() (2000).
217. The legislative history of the statute that is now IDEA includes a statement from
Senator Harrison Williams, who was its principal author, that "exhaustion of the adminis-
trative procedures established under this part should not be required .. . in cases where
such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter." 121 CONG. REC.
37,416 (1975). When Congress added what is now 20 U.S.C. § 1415() in 1986, Senator
Simon and Representative Miller, who managed the bill in the Senate and House, de-
scribed the congressional understanding of when the exhaustion requirement does not
apply:
It is important to note that there are certain situations in which it is not appropri-
ate to require the exhaustion of EHA [Education of the Handicapped Act, now
IDEA] administrative remedies before filing a civil law suit. These include com-
plaints that: First, an agency has failed to provide services specified in the child's
individualized educational program [IEP]; second, an agency has abridged or de-
nied a handicapped child's procedural rights-for example, failure to implement
required procedures concerning least restrictive environment or convening of
meetings; three, an agency had adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general
applicability that is contrary to the law, or where it would otherwise be futile to
use the due process procedures-for example, where the hearing officer lacks the
authority to grant the relief sought; and four, an emergency situation exists-for
example, failure to provide services during the pendency of proceedings, or a
complaint concerning summer school placement which would not likely be re-
solved in time for the student to take advantage of the program.
131 CONG. REC. 21,392-93 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon). Representative Miller added
that "neither I nor others who wrote the law intended that parents should be forced to
expend valuable time and money exhausting unreasonable or unlawful administrative hur-
dles .... Id. at 31,376.
218. See, e.g., Doe v. Ariz. Dep't of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 685 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring
exhaustion in action over failure to provide special education services to eligible jail in-
mates); Gardner v. Sch. Bd., 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring exhaustion in
challenge to policy forbidding taping of meetings); Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877
F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (requiring exhaustion in challenge to use of time-out
rooms); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 937 (6th Cir. 1989)
(reversing on exhaustion grounds injunction against rule preventing participation in
sports by child who transferred between schools when the learning disability allegedly
caused the transfer); Radcliffe v. Sch. Bd., 38 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (re-
quiring exhaustion in dispute over policy forbidding scheduling of meeting outside of reg-
ular school hours). Courts have also required exhaustion even when hearing rights or
other procedural guarantees have been denied. See, e.g., W.L.G. v. Houston County Bd. of
Educ., 975 F. Supp. 1317, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that claim based on refusal to
obey settlement agreement had to be exhausted); Koster v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ.,
921 F. Supp. 1453, 1457 (D. Md. 1996) (requiring exhaustion despite plaintiffs claim that
notice was inadequate).
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many cases involving allegations of disability harassment, courts have
dismissed damages claims for lack of administrative exhaustion. 21 9
Since hearing officers may not award damages in the IDEA ad-
ministrative process, 220 these courts are ignoring the futility exception
built into the exhaustion requirement. 221  Furthermore, because
many of the cases, such as Charlie F, 222 do not even involve an IDEA
claim, the courts are also ignoring the language of § 1415(l), which
requires exhaustion of claims under statutes other than IDEA only
when the relief sought would be available under IDEA,223 a statute
that does not permit hearing officers to award damages. 2 4 Recogniz-
ing the strength of these arguments, many courts have refused to re-
quire exhaustion in harassment and analogous cases.2 25
219. See, e.g., Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving
ridicule and humiliation of student with attention deficit disorder and panic attacks);
Kubistal v. Hirsch,. No. 98 C 3838, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9,
1999) (involving ridicule and isolation of student with visual impairment by teacher and
principal); Franklin v. Frid, 7 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (concerning aide's
physical and psychological abuse of child with cerebral palsy); Shields v. Helena Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 943 P.2d 999, 1006 (Mont. 1997) (concerning exclusion from trip, humiliation, and
name-calling by teachers).
220. See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that damages
are not available in an IDEA administrative proceeding).
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the legislative intent
underlying IDEA was to not require exhaustion of administrative procedures if exhaustion
would be futile).
222. In Charlie F., the plaintiff brought claims for violations of the Constitution, section
504, Title II of the ADA, and state law. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991.
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2000). The first half of the provision helps make this point
clear by emphasizing the availability of remedies under statutes that provide relief that
includes damages:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, proce-
dures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act of 1990 .... title V of the Rehabilitation Act .... or other Federal laws
... except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this subchapter, [the administrative] procedures [re-
quired by] this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be re-
quired had the action been brought under this subchapter.
Id.
224. SeePadilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,233 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that
damages are not available under IDEA at the administrative hearing level).
225. See id. at 1274-75 (holding that exhaustion was not necessary in the case of a child
who fractured her skull after falling from a stroller placed in a closet); Covington v. Knox
County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) (declaring that exhaustion was not
required in the case of a child kept isolated in a vault-like room); Witte v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to require exhaustion in case
where child was force-fed, choked, and abused); WB., 67 F.3d at 495-96 (refusing to re-
quire exhaustion in case over delays in evaluation and placement of child); McKay v. Win-
throp Bd. of Educ., No. 96-131-B, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23372, at *9-10 (D. Me. June 6,
1997) (holding that section 504 and ADA damage claims for failure to make building ac-
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Policy considerations might be advanced to support the applica-
tion of the exhaustion requirement in special education damages
cases. 226 The policies behind administrative exhaustion include mak-
ing maximum use of both the policymaking authority and expertise of
administrators, and achieving economy in provision of procedural
mechanisms to challenge government decisions. 22v The connection
between exhaustion and those policies is highly attenuated in educa-
tional harassment damages cases, however. First, the due process
hearing officer is required to be independent of the school system
and the state educational agency, 228 and, therefore, is in no position
to develop policy for those entities. 229 Second, the due process hear-
ing officer need have no particular qualifications 23 ° and, thus, will not
necessarily have any expertise to apply. Third, courts deny that hear-
ing officers have the power to order awards of damages, 21 ' and it is
not clear that hearing officers confronting damages-only claims would
even hold a hearing. Even if they do, it is highly likely that after the
hearing the parties will take the case to court and retry it before a
jury-the factfinder in a section 504 or ADA damages case 232 -
thereby eliminating any administrative or judicial economy advan-
tages of exhaustion.
Moreover, Congress did not approach exhaustion in special edu-
cation cases purely as a policy matter.233 Congress understood that
practical considerations about the utility of the administrative process
should control and recognized the probable weaknesses in the IDEA
cessible need not be exhausted, stressing the absence of availability of damages under
IDEA).
226. See Seligmann, supra note 214, at 520-26, 528-32 (citing a number of rationales for
supporting the exhaustion doctrine, including accuracy, efficiency, agency autonomy, and
judicial economy).
227. WEBER, supra note 96, § 21.8 (discussing the policies underlying the exhaustion
doctrine and collecting authorities).
228. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0(3) (2000); see Mayson v. Teague, 749 F.2d 652, 657-58 (1lth
Cir. 1984) (applying independence requirement).
229. See Mayson, 749 F.2d at 655 (affirming the decision that "university personnel who
have actively participated in the formulation of state educational policies" are not permit-
ted to act as hearing officers).
230. Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 577, 583 (D. Md. 2000) ("There is no fed-
eral right to a competent or knowledgeable [special education] ALJ."); see Carnwath v. Bd.
of Educ., 33 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (D. Md. 1998) (finding no training requirements for due
process hearing officers in IDEA).
231. See, e.g., W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the adminis-
trative law judge's inability to award damages).
232. See Whitehead v. Sch. Bd., 918 F. Supp. 1515, 1523-24 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding
jury trial right in a section 504 action for damages in a special education case).
233. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to IDEA's exhaus-
tion requirement).
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due process scheme. 23 4 Section 1415(l) excuses exhaustion when the
claim is brought under a provision other than the IDEA cause of ac-
tion and the relief sought is not available under IDEA.23 5 The lan-
guage of § 1415(l) prevails over any administrative law policy that
might call for its judicial rewriting.
V. NEW LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEAsuREs
Deterring and remedying harassment by means of § 12203(b)
and other legal remedies will go far to promote integration by workers
and students with disabilities as equals in society. The remedies will
not be enough to institute full integration, but they represent a start.
There is a striking need for further innovation. Some of the potential
measures are only modest reforms of existing law; one hopes that they
would garner significant support.
A. The Need for Additional Legal Measures to Promote Integration
The legal prohibitions against segregation and exclusion found
in the ADA236 might be thought to complete the process of integrat-
ing workers and students, but the ADA provisions have seen little de-
velopment. This is a sharp contrast to the extensive development of
the definition provisions and the qualified individual-reasonable ac-
commodation provisions.2" 7 One of the rare ADA employment cases
concerning segregation, Duda v. Board of Education,238 upheld a Title I
claim when a school district learned that ajanitor had a mental illness
and responded by transferring him to a location where he had to work
by himself, instructing him not to speak to anyone.23 9 As for public
services, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring24° is the case of note, but other
cases have not developed its ideas as much as might be hoped.241 The
234. See id.
235. See id
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (iv) (2002).
237. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12111 (2000).
238. 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1998).
239. Id. at 1059-60. But see Tyler v. Ispat Inland Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir.
2001) (recognizing segregation as discrimination, but finding that refusal to transfer em-
ployee with mental illness back to the original job site failed to constitute violation when
employee was integrated with other workers at new site). See generally supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text (discussing Duda and Tyler).
240. 527 U.S. 581 (1999); see supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text (discussing
Olmstead).
241. See Bruggeman v. Glagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 913 (2003) (reversing dismissal of sec-
tion 504 and ADA Title II claim for non-institutional residential services to individuals with
developmental disabilities; recommending that parties and court apply Olmstead on
remand).
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education cases decided under IDEA go in both directions on the is-
sue of integration of children with disabilities into the mainstream,
demonstrating significant differences in attitude among the judicial
circuits.2
42
Apart from the ADA provision enforced in Olmstead and the spe-
cial education law provision relating to the least restrictive environ-
ment, there is little in the law or public programs that affirmatively
integrates people with disabilities into mainstream society. Professor
Stein observes:
[I] mprovement in blacks' relative earnings has been realized
because of the federal government's massive enforcement of
antidiscrimination policies, including voting rights and
school desegregation, that were concentrated on the South.
Currently, there exists no equivalent monumental federal
government enforcement policy of employing or integrating
the disabled.243
B. Legal Reforms to Promote Integration
What is needed is a legislative agenda that will go beyond ending
harassment and forbidding segregation, and will actively promote in-
teraction between individuals with disabilities and without disabilities
on an equal level. I believe that this agenda would have several
components:
1. Vocational Services Reforms.--Currently, vocational services pro-
vided to people with disabilities focus on sheltered work and, for indi-
viduals with more skills, supported employment in mainstreamed
242. Compare Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1223 (3d Cir. 1993) (approving
mainstreamed program for child with Down's syndrome), with Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282
F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 948 (2002) (rejecting mainstreamed place-
ment for child with Rett syndrome). See generally Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Envi-
ronment Obligation as an Entitlement to Educational Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIsJ. Juv.
L. & POL'Y 147 (2001) (discussing interpretation of obligation to educate children with
disabilities in least restrictive environment); Joshua Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the
Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting Provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2002) (comparing approaches of U.S. Circuits in cases regarding
placement of students in the least restrictive environment). Integration remains an impor-
tant goal and a paper protection in the ADA, but the norm is underenforced.
243. Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 111, at 51, 53. As noted above, an exception, although it can
hardly be called a monumental effort in light of the results, is the integration mandate in
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See supra note 242 and accompanying text
(discussing least restrictive environment obligation in IDEA).
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settings.244 In recent years, the program's emphasis on supported em-
ployment has grown. 245 This growth should continue, for it permits
more people with more severe disabilities to succeed in the competi-
tive workplace. The law should also encourage the development of
small businesses run by people with disabilities. A program to foster
entrepreneurship among individuals with disabilities has seen success
in Iowa and should be replicated elsewhere through state legisla-
tion.2 46 Supported employment brings people into the workplace, but
the hazard is that the new workers will not be perceived as equal and
may be subject to harassment and other discouragement unless the
ADA is vigorously enforced.247 Entrepreneurship programs seek to
avoid the inferiority problem by effectively making the vocational ser-
vices client the boss, serving customers just as any other merchant
does, while receiving support as needed from the vocational services
agency.
2 48
2. Affirmative Action and Job Set-asides for Qualified Workers with Dis-
abilities.-In other writing, I have advocated enforcement of existing
laws requiring federal agencies and federal contractors to engage in
affirmative action to employ individuals with disabilities. 24 9 I have also
proposed importing to the United States the programs found else-
where in the developed world that require employers to set aside a
fraction of their jobs for people who have severely disabling condi-
tions.25 ° Others have challenged various aspects of these reforms.251
Of greatest concern here, however, is to what extent actively promot-
ing the hiring of individuals with disabilities, to the point of setting
244. See Mark C. Weber, Towards Access, Accountability, Procedural Regularity and Participa-
tion: The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 and 1993, J. REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 1994,
at 21.
245. Id. at 21-23 (describing increased emphasis on programs that involve placement of
individuals in competitive employment with job coaches and other supports).
246. See Peter D. Blanck et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Pre-
liminary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 IowA L. REv. 1583 (2000) (discussing small-
business creation programs).
247. See Weber, supra note 244, at 22 (describing the 1992 and 1993 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act and their effects on supported employment).
248. Innovative programs of this type include a Canadian one providing catering and
executive gifts and one in Maryland furnishing organic vegetables. See Bow Catering, About
Us, at http://www.bowcatering.ca/aboutus.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003); Red Wiggler
Foundation Mission Organization, at http://www.redwiggler.org/aboutus/organization.
html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
249. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment
Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REv. 123, 142-66 (1998).
250. Id. at 166-74.
251. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 18, at 386-87 (arguing against the use of set-asides for
people with disabilities).
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aside a percentage of jobs, promotes or fails to promote integration.
There is certainly a risk that workers who are hired to fill a quota or
other government mandate might be featherbedded or assigned a
marginal status.2 52 Nevertheless, the genius of the free enterprise sys-
tem is that the employer has the incentive to make the maximum
profit from whatever employees are there and to permit workers to
gravitate to wherever they will contribute the most marginal utility to
the company.253 Enforcement of reasonable accommodation man-
dates should help that movement.254 It is also likely that as the in-
come of workers with disabilities increases, their status will rise, and
this will help diminish status differentials.255 Interestingly, the more
commonly identified problem with the European programs is not seg-
regation of workers, but outright evasion of the law, 25 6 a problem that
sufficient governmental willpower could solve.
3. Enhancement of Special Education Related Services. -The obliga-
tion to mainstream children with disabilities at school has been viewed
for far too long as the negative command: Thou shalt not segregate.
In fact, the language of the statute imposes a positive obligation:
School systems shall provide services to permit children to be inte-
grated successfully. The language requires that states must guarantee
that:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabili-
ties ... are educated with children who are not disabled, and
that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular education environ-
ment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability
... is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.257
The obligation is a positive one, to provide related services such
as those of aides and technology, in order to achieve satisfactory edu-
252. See Weber, supra note 249, at 172 (noting that such practices provide individuals
with disabilities no opportunities for advancement).
253. Id at 172-73.
254. Id.
255. Id at 173; see WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SEC'Y OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE 34-36 (1973) (describing economic status as most important
determinant of social acceptance).
256. See Lisa Waddington, Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe:
From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 COMp. LAB. L.J. 62, 66-69 (1996) (noting the
success of the German system of job quotas, but pointing out continuing problems with
compliance).
257. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (A) (2000).
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cation in regular classes.258 Often, however, the services are deficient,
integrated schooling fails, and the courts declare the child, rather
than the school system, to be the problem. 259 States need to legislate
the provision of related services and appropriate the money for them
in order to comply with the related services mandate; the federal gov-
ernment must hold the states accountable for fulfilling their
obligations.
4. Welfare Reform.-In another writing, I have also suggested that
Social Security should be expanded to provide partial disability bene-
fits for people who have significant limitations, but who do not meet
the Social Security Disability Insurance standard of total incapacity ex-
pected to last more than a year or result in death.26 ° A program of
this type would help pull people with disabilities out of poverty, while
at the same time encouraging them to seek work in order to have
income to supplement the pension amounts. 261 Unlike the situation
under existing Social Security, the person would not have to drop out
of the labor force to receive benefits, but would be induced to work as
much as manageable given the functional limits imposed by the disa-
bility and the continuing failure of the workplace to fully accommo-
date workers with disabling conditions.26 2 Having a disability imposes
costs on an individual. 263 Not only are medical bills of people with
disabilities higher than those for other persons,26 4 but disabilities typi-
cally reduce the hours a person can work and frequently diminish ca-
pacities to move, lift, communicate, and think-the activities that
employers pay workers to do. 265 A system of partial disability benefits
shifts some of those costs to the public;266 it is a component of social
security systems throughout Europe. 267 An American program would
raise the condition of people with disabilities while encouraging inte-
gration in employment.268
258. See Weber, supra note 242, at 148-51 (discussing school systems' obligation to com-
ply with the positive mandate to provide services to facilitate mainstreaming).
259. See WEBER, supra note 96, §§ 9.2, 9.3-.6 (collecting cases).
260. See Weber, supra note 18, at 943-47 (advocating the provision of nonmeans-tested
partial disability benefits for individuals with disabilities).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id
267. See id. at 945 ("In Europe, social security systems typically provide partial disability
benefits if the individual has an impairment with effects severe enough to meet a threshold
of loss of work capacity.").
268. Id. at 94547.
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The campaign in favor of the ADA was instrumental in bringing
the disparate disability-specific groups into a formidable political
movement.269 A legislative reform effort may be just what the move-
ment needs now to maintain that momentum.
VI. SOCIAL REFORM TO MATCH LAW REFORM
Does society alter the law, or does the law alter society? In actual-
ity, it is some of both, of course. Voluntary social action to promote
integration of individuals with disabilities into ordinary settings would
go far to accomplish the ADA's legal goal of ending forced separation.
One place to start would be voluntary action by employers and schools
to diminish harassment. They need to adopt policies against harass-
ment, train supervisors and co-workers, encourage the making of com-
plaints of harassment, investigate the complaints, and impose effective
sanctions when harassment occurs.27 °
The greater task, and one that I expect will remain a voluntary
one for the foreseeable future, is the effort to integrate people with
disabilities by altering social conditions-an effort to eliminate the
distinction between the normal and the abnormal and to focus more
on social relationships than on social categories.27 1 Of course, this is
an enormous task, and one to which category-based laws such as the
ADA (and my category-based proposals) may in some respects work at
272cross purposes. Nevertheless, there is much to be said for anything
that helps redefine disability as part of everyday experience, rather
than as abnormal, or strange, or "the other." Rosemarie Garland
269. Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans
with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 255 (1994):
[T]he campaign for the ADA's passage "brought this fragmented population to-
gether in a fight against discrimination." As noted at the time by ADA lobbyist Liz
Savage, "People with epilepsy now will be advocates for the same piece of legisla-
tion as people who are deaf .... That has never happened before. And that's
really historic."
(quoting JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 126-27 (1993) (footnotes omitted)).
270. See Steven D. Baderian et al., Managing Employment Risks in Light of the New Rulings in
Sexual Harassment Law, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 364-68 (1999) (describing components
of effective policies against sexual harassment).
271. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 173-224 (1990) (encouraging movement away from emphasis on categories
of people and towards emphasis on social relations); cf MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR
MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 30-58 (1997) (suggesting uses and limits of group
identities).
272. See Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation,
2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 248-318 (discussing contradictions inherent in the portrayal of a
person who experienced a denial of accommodations as a victim).
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Thomson lauds advertising that works to redefine disability as an ordi-
nary part of life and society:
In the aggregate, contemporary advertising casts disabled
people as simply one of many variations that compose the
market to which they appeal. Such routinization of disability
imagery not only brings disability as a common human expe-
rience out of the closet but enables people with disabilities-
especially those who acquire impairments as adults-to
imagine themselves as part of the ordinary world, rather than
as a special class of untouchables and unviewables .... This
form of realism constitutes a rhetoric of equality radical in its
refusal to foreground disability as a difference. 273
Unfortunately, the absence of economic power on the part of
people with disabilities operates as a limit on what can be accom-
plished. Because of the poverty of people with disabilities, and the
difficulty of using employment to get out of poverty, people with disa-
bilities remain at the margins of the economy. Simon Ungar
comments:
Disabled people, as a relatively small and generally economi-
cally challenged group, have therefore not generally bene-
fited from [accommodations]. Where businesses have made
alterations, these have often been made for publicity pur-
poses rather than specifically for the benefit of disabled cus-
tomers; in other words, the businesses want to be seen to be
making adaptations for disabled people so as to be viewed as
caring and charitable by the economically strong (generally
able-bodied) members of society.274
In other words, economic power is the prerequisite for success.
Thus, economic advances furthered by employment and welfare re-
form may be the crucial first step in the effort for change in social
attitudes that will lead to integration on a plane of equality.
CONCLUSION
Law is an imperfect tool, but it is one with an important role in
stopping harassment and promoting integration of people with disa-
273. Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Seeing the Disabled: Visual Rhetorics of Disability in Popu-
lar Photography, in THE NEW DISABILtITy HISTORY, supra note 50, at 335, 368 (describing the
"rhetoric of the ordinary"). In Thomson's article, this passage is accompanied by a repro-
duction of a clothing advertisement that features an attractive male who has a prosthesis in
place of a right hand. See id. at 369.
274. Simon Ungar, Disability and the Built Environment, Distance Education Centre, Uni-
versity of Sheffield, at http://fhis.gcal.ac.uk/PSY/sun/LectureNotes/city/city.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003).
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bilities into the mainstream of employment and education. The re-
casting of approaches to existing law that I suggest, the use of 42
U.S.C. § 12203(b) and correction of IDEA exhaustion doctrine, are an
exceedingly modest first step. Legislative reform with regard to voca-
tional services, affirmative action and job set-asides, as well as welfare
policy improvements, sets a much more ambitious agenda. Re-
forming the whole of society's attitudes is an enormous, though in my
view, quite realistic task. In working for these changes, there is no
better inspiration than Stanley S. Herr, the individual whose life work
this symposium celebrates.275
275. See In Memoriam: Stanley S. Herr, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 287, 289-314 (2002) (featuring
articles discussing Stanley S. Herr's life and career).
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